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Contract Law
The Law Commission's proposals on privity
by Stephen A Smith
In The Third Party Rule of Contract: 
Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties 
No. 242 (1996), the Law Commission 
proposes that the third party rule   the 
rule that only parties to a contract can 
enforce the contract   be reformed so 
that third parties have the right to 
enforce a contract where either:
(1) the contract expressly confers such a 
right; or
(2) the contract purports to confer a 
benefit on the third party and does 
not indicate an intention that such a 
right not be enjoyed by third parties.
It seems to be widely accepted by- 
academics, judges and the Law 
Commission that the case for reforming 
privity is self-evident, the only real issue 
being how reform should be achieved. 
Thus most critical comments on the
NO MERE HISTORICAL BLIP
The third party rule in contract law is no 
mere historical blip. This can be seen if we 
address squarely the critical question that 
must be asked any time the law contemplates 
extending a cause of action to a new category 
of plaintiff-defendant: what right of the 
plaintiff has the defendant infringed?
report and on the earlier consultation 
document (No. 121, 1991) focus on the 
details of reform.
The 'how' and 'why' of reform are 
connected, however; and it is suggested 
that the difficulties encountered by the 
Commission in getting the details of 
reform correct (discussed below) can be 
traced to a failure to appreciate fully the 
central role played by the third party rule 
in contract law. The rule is no mere 
historical blip. This can be seen if we 
address squarely the critical question that 
must be asked any time the law- 
contemplates extending a cause of action 
to a new category of plaintiff-defendant: 
what right of the plaintiff has the 
defendant infringed? The answer in this 
case is that while in certain circumstances 
defaulting promisors arguably have 
infringed third parties' rights, the rights 
infringed are not rights to enforce
agreements to which third parties are 
strangers.
THE LAW'S PROTECTION
One right protected by private law is 
the right to have unjust enrichments 
reversed. A third party has no possible 
action in this regard since, while a 
promisor might be unjustly enriched by 
breaking a promise to benefit that party, 
the enrichment is at the expense of the 
person who paid for the promise, not the 
third party'. Admittedly, the rules 
regarding, inter alia, total failure of 
consideration may arbitrarily limit 
protection of the promisee's 
restitutionarv interest but such 
limitations cannot be blamed on the third 
party rule.
A second right protected by the law is 
the right not to have your person or 
property' harmed in certain ways, 
typically through another's intentional or 
careless actions. A third party could be 
harmed by reasonably relying on a 
promise made by A to B. Under current 
English law, a third party' cannot recover 
for losses so incurred. The reason, 
however, is not the third party rule, as 
that rule bars only actions in contract. A 
third party who seeks compensation for 
loss incurred in reliance on a promisor's 
statement of intention is not seeking too
enforce a promise qua promise, but to 
enforce a duty which, if it exists, is 
imposed by law. In this instance, reform 
efforts should be directed at the rules 
governing the use of estoppel as a cause 
of action.
A third right protected by private law is 
the right to have voluntary obligations 
(e.g. promises) made to you performed. 
It is this, the contractual right, that the 
Law Commission proposes granting to 
third parties. Even leaving consideration 
aside, however, the duty to perform a 
promise is not owed to the world but 
only to the promisee. Promissory 
obligations are obligations undertaken to 
particular people: the word 'promisee' 
exists precisely so that we can distinguish 
persons to whom promissory duties are 
owed from all others.
Indeed if promissory obligations were 
not personal, then in theory anyone 
should be able to enforce a contract. And 
third parties, by definition, are not 
promisees of the relevant promise. They 
are intended beneficiaries but that is a 
different thing. If I tell a colleague that I 
intend to give her £100, she cannot sue 
me if I fail to do so, even if consideration 
is abolished. A mere intent to benefit, 
even where the benefit is a legal right, is 
not a promise and therefore does not, 
and should not, give rise to contractualO
THE MOST IMPORTANT FEATURE
It is basic to private law that a successful 
plaintiff must show that the defendant 
breached his duty and that this breach 
infringed the plaintiff's rights. Duties are 
correlative to rights: that is why we have 
plaintiffs suing defendants, not plaintiffs 
suing the state and the state suing defendants.
obligations. Thus, while the defendant ino '
a privity case may have breached a 
promissory duty, that duty is owed to the 
promisee, not the third party.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES
The bifurcation of right and duty is 
fatal. It is basic to private law that a 
successful plaintiff must show that the 
defendant breached his duty and that this 
breach infringed the plaintiff's rights.or o
Duties are correlative to rights: that isO
why we have plaintiffs suing defendants, 
not plaintiffs suing the state and the state 
suing defendants. Granting third parties 
contractual rights would sever the most 
important feature of private law: the link 
between plaintiff and defendant.
It mav be that the rules governing
j O O
hard-to-quantify losses inadequately 
compensate promisees for the breach of 
promises to benefit others. That, 
however, is not the fault of the third party 
rule. It may also be that in some cases a 
third party, though not privy to the 
agreement between A and B, is privy (i.e. 
the promisee) to a separate but identical 
promise by A, which promise the third 
party cannot enforce. But again, the third 
party rule is not the culprit: the culprit is 
consideration.
Might third party rights be sui generis; 
and thus comparison with unjust 
enrichment, tort and contract unhelpful? 
It is not clear what interest such rights 
could protect, nor why such rights ought 
to allow third parties to obtain the 
benefit of a contract between strangers, 
but even if such rights did exist the third 
party rule is not a barrier to their 
protection. The third party rule, to 
repeat, bars only actions in contract.
INEVITABLE DIFFICULTIES
Seen in this light, it is to be expected 
that the Law Commission's project 
would encounter problems in deciding1 o
the 'how' issues of reform. The details do 
not fall neatly into place because the 
proposal is inconsistent with the 
structure of private law. Consider the 
question of whether contracting parties 
should be able to vary their contracts. 
The Law Commission proposes that a 
third party's rights crystallise once he or 
she either relies on or assents to the 
contract (cl. 2(1), (2)). Reliance is 
relevant if the third party's action is for 
induced detrimental reliance but the
action is in contract where reliance is not 
relevant. Assent, which appears similar to 
the contractual requirement of 
acceptance, seems a better candidate at 
first blush. But to what is the third party 
assenting? You cannot assent to an 
agreement to which you are not party. An 
agreement is an agreement whether or 
not a third party' assents to it.
Of course some benefits cannot in 
practice be conferred without the 
beneficiary's consent: I cannot leave 
goods on your property \vithout your 
permission. Many benefits, however, can 
be conferred without permission: if A 
and B agree that A will send C £100 in 
the post there is nothing to which C can 
assent. C can have knowledge of the 
agreement but it is hard to see why mere 
knowledge is relevant to C's rights.
A second 'how' question is whether 
the promisor should be able to raise 
defences or set-offs against the third 
party that could have been raised against 
the promisee. The proposal that this be 
allowed (cl. 3) seems to envision the 
third party- as either a joint promisee or
as the promisee's undisclosed principle 
or assignee. Yet the contracting parties' 
ability to vary their agreement is 
inconsistent with these possibilities. 
What defences or set-offs should then be 
allowed? Unfortunately, there is no right 
answer to this question, just as there is no 
right answer to the question of when a 
third party's rights should crystallise. 
There is no right answer because there is 
no coherent principle underlying the 
proposals from which a right answer 
could be derived. Ad hoc solutions are all 
that can be expected.
CONCLUSION
The third party rule is a fundamental 
feature of contract law. Any attempts to 
reform the law's treatment of privity 
cases   which, as I have hinted, may well 
be required   should be directed 
elsewhere. ©
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